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The Continued Viability of New York’s Juvenile Offender Act

“What’s done to children, they will do to society.”1
I.	INTRODUCTION

Starting in the early 1960s through the 1970s, New York City and a number of
other large cities experienced a wave of violent juvenile crime. 2 Consequently, many
states began to question the effectiveness of their juvenile courts and took steps to
hold juveniles accountable for their crimes as adults.3 In doing so, many states enacted
“transfer laws,”4 which provide a mechanism for transferring serious juvenile offenders
from juvenile to adult criminal court for prosecution and punishment.5 Unlike
juvenile courts, where the primary purpose is to treat the juvenile and integrate him
1.

The Harper Book of Quotations 94 (Robert I. Fitzhenry ed., 3d ed. 1993) (quoting Karl Menninger).

2.

Nationally, from 1960 to 1975, the arrests of young offenders age thirteen to twenty for homicide increased
92%, from 7.6 to 14.6 per 100,000. Franklin E. Zimring, American Youth Violence: Issues and Trends, 1
Crime & Just. 67, 75 tbl.1 (1979). During the same period, the arrests for forcible rape grew 17%, from
24.0 to 28.3 per 100,000. Id. The arrests of young people for robbery increased 115%, starting at 118
arrests per 100,000 in 1960 and ending with 254 in 1975. Id. at 78 tbl.2. In addition, the arrests for
aggravated assault grew 129% during that time period, from 96 to 220 arrests per 100,000. Id. at 80 tbl.3.
Furthermore, “offenses of violence” were mostly concentrated in big cities. Id. at 84. For example, the
youth homicide arrest rate was three times higher in cities with a population over 250,000 than in other
areas, and the robbery rate was six times greater in large cities. Id.; see also The Youth Crime Plague, Time,
July 11, 1977, at 18, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,919043,00.html
(discussing the incidents and costs of juvenile crime in large cities, including San Francisco, Chicago,
Detroit, New York City, and Miami).

3.

See discussion infra Part II.C.

4.

The term “transfer law,” used throughout this note, refers to a law that requires or permits the transfer of
certain young offenders from juvenile to criminal court for prosecution and punishment. New York’s
Juvenile Offender Law is a transfer law that requires thirteen- to fifteen-year-olds charged with a
specified offense to proceed through the adult, rather than the juvenile, justice system. Since 1997, every
state has had a transfer law on the books. Patrick Griffin, Patricia Torbet & Linda Szymanski,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Trying
Juveniles as Adults in Criminal Court: An Analysis of State Transfer Provisions 1 (1998),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172836.pdf. For example, Ohio’s transfer law allows juvenile
court judges to transfer juveniles age fourteen and over who are charged with a felony or certain
misdemeanors to criminal court. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.12 (LexisNexis 2011). Texas’s
transfer law authorizes juvenile court judges to transfer any child age fourteen or older charged with a
first-degree felony, or fifteen or older charged with a second- or third-degree felony, to criminal court to
be tried as an adult if the judge determines that “because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the
background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.” Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 54.02 (West Supp. 2011). Florida’s transfer law requires that certain children—those who have
already been convicted and sentenced as an adult for a previous crime, who are sixteen or older and
charged with a violent crime, or who have been adjudicated in juvenile court for felonies on three separate
occasions—be automatically transferred from juvenile to adult criminal court for prosecution. See Fla.
Stat. § 39.052 (current version at § 985.556/7) (1997). In addition, Florida law gives a prosecutor the
discretion to decide whether to try juveniles age sixteen and above charged with serious offenses in adult
criminal court or juvenile court “when in his judgment and discretion the public interest requires that
adult sanctions be considered or imposed.” Id. § 39.047 (current version § 985.21); see also id. § 39.022
(current version at § 985.201). Florida’s transfer law also allows juvenile court judges to transfer juveniles
age fourteen and older to criminal court for trial. See id. § 985.556.

5.

See discussion infra Part II.D.
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back into the community, criminal courts focus on punishment and incapacitation.6
New York was one of the first states to “get tough” on juvenile “superpredators” when
it enacted the Juvenile Offender Law, a type of transfer law, in 1978.7 This broad
statutory scheme excludes juveniles as young as thirteen who are charged with a
serious offense from juvenile court, requiring their prosecution in criminal court and
thus subjecting them to increased punishment.8 By the late 1990s, every state and the
District of Columbia had created a mechanism to transfer youth from the jurisdiction
of juvenile court to criminal court in certain circumstances.9
Approximately thirty years after New York’s transfer statute set the standard for
harsher punishment,10 new developments in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
indicate a growing rejection of severe punitive measures for juvenile offenders. In the
2005 case of Roper v. Simmons, the Court, after considering the small number of
states that continued to authorize juvenile death sentences, held that it is cruel and
unusual punishment to sentence juveniles under the age of eighteen to death.11 Five
years later, the Court held in Graham v. Florida that imposing a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole on juveniles convicted of crimes other
than homicide also violates the U.S. Constitution.12 And in June 2012, in Miller v.
Alabama, the Court abolished mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles
convicted of all crimes, including homicides.13 In these three cases, the Supreme
Court considered the psychological differences between juveniles and adults, such as
their immaturity and susceptibility to peer pressure,14 and reasoned that these innate
character traits should result in lessened punishment for juvenile offenders.15
Following the latest changes, some states began adjudicating more children through
the juvenile court system.16 The rates of juveniles tried in criminal court under certain
6.

See discussion infra Part II.A.

7.

See discussion infra Part II.C.

8.

See discussion infra Part II.E.

9.

Griffin et al., supra note 4.

10.

See Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique,
in The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Criminal
Court 83, 115–16 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (“The 1978 New York excludedoffense law provided a model that other states subsequently followed to simplify the process of trying
juveniles as adults.”).

11.

543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).

12.

130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).

13.

132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).

14.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (noting that juveniles lack maturity and a developed sense of responsibility,
are more susceptible to peer pressure, and that their “personality traits are more transitory, less fixed”);
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.

15.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.

16.

See Mosi Secret, States Prosecute Fewer Teenagers in Adult Courts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 2011, at A1
(explaining that, in the past few years, five states have passed laws or introduced bills to increase the
number of youth adjudicated in juvenile court).
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types of transfer mechanisms started to fall, and a few states recently increased the
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.17 Although many states are moving away
from trying minors as adults and instead focusing on rehabilitation through the juvenile
justice system, some states, including New York, have not adopted this therapeutic
approach and instead continue to enforce their transfer statutes.18
This note will argue that the New York Juvenile Offender Law—specifically the
provisions regarding automatic transfer to criminal court for juveniles charged with
certain crimes—is out of date. New York legislators, attorneys, and judges, in
continuing to implement the law, have disregarded recent behavioral science research
documenting fundamental differences between juvenile and adult offenders. In doing
so, they have ignored the growing national movement that both rejects severe
punishments for juveniles and embraces a rehabilitative framework, and they have
discounted statistics showing the law has no effect on juvenile crime rates and
recidivism. In order to comport with the recent U.S. Supreme Court holdings in
Roper, Graham, and Miller, New York courts must begin to interpret the law’s transfer
provisions with a focus on rehabilitation and treatment. In the alternative, the entire
statutory scheme should be thoroughly amended, which would include abolishing
automatic transfer of juvenile offenders to criminal court and instead requiring that
individualized transfer decisions be made in juvenile court.
Part II of this note will discuss the historical development of juvenile courts in
the United States, starting with the creation of the first juvenile court in 1899 and
proceeding through the major trends in the area of juvenile justice over the past
century. These trends include the latest developments in juvenile justice reform—the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper v. Simmons,19 Graham v. Florida, 20 and Miller v.
Alabama, 21 and the movement away from punishment for juveniles and back toward
rehabilitation. Part II also introduces common types of transfer laws implemented in
17.

See discussion infra Part II.F.1.

18.

Comparisons are difficult as only thirteen states report the number of cases in which juveniles are
prosecuted in criminal court. Patrick Griffin, Sean Addie, Benjamin Adams & Kathy Firestine,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Trying Juveniles
as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting 17 (2011), available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf. Of those states reporting data, Florida, Oregon, Arizona,
Tennessee, and Montana have the highest juvenile transfer rate. Id. at 18. New York and many other states
do not report this information, so rough estimates regarding the number of juveniles tried in criminal
court must be made based on the scope of each state’s current laws. See id. at 20. Since New York prosecutes
all youth age sixteen and above in criminal court, and also requires that certain juveniles be automatically
transferred to criminal court based only on their age and offense charged, one may assume that New York
has a high rate of prosecuting juveniles as adults. See id. at 20–21. One report found that out of 2449
criminal court dispositions of juvenile offenders in New York City from 2005 through 2008, 23.8% were
dismissed and 14.7% removed to family court, with the remaining 61.5% continuing through the adult
system. See Ashley Cannon et al., Citizens Crime Commission of New York City 87 (2010),
available at http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/GuideToJuvenileJusticeInNYC.pdf.

19.

543 U.S. at 551.

20. 130 S. Ct. at 2011.
21.

132 S. Ct. at 2455.
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other states and describes the basic provisions of New York’s transfer law, called the
Juvenile Offender Law.
Part III examines the central principles revisited by the Supreme Court in Roper,
Graham, and Miller: (1) juveniles are not as culpable as adult offenders due to
fundamental developmental differences, (2) juveniles are more amenable to reform,
and (3) there is a growing national consensus against harsh punishments for juveniles.
Part III also argues that the transfer and sentencing provisions of the Juvenile Offender
Law, which require certain children to be automatically tried as adults and subject to
lengthy prison terms without first considering their lack of maturity and rehabilitative
potential, are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence.
Part IV provides a number of recommendations to bring the Juvenile Offender
Law into compliance with these recent changes, including (1) statutory amendments
that would require all charges against juveniles to begin in juvenile court and allow a
child’s transfer to criminal court only after an amenability hearing, (2) increasing the
upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction to seventeen, and (3) introducing methods
with which courts and juvenile advocates can interpret the juvenile offender provisions
to result in less punitive treatment. Part IV concludes with a summary of the main
arguments and solutions presented in this note.
II.	The Historical Development of Juvenile Courts in the United
States: From Rehabilitation to Punishment . . . and Back Again?

The following discussion addresses the developments behind the modern juvenile
court, starting with the creation of the first juvenile court in 1899 and the introduction
of due process protections in juvenile proceedings in the mid-1960s. This section will
also explore New York’s punitive response to increasing juvenile crime rates in the
1970s and introduce the reader to the various types of laws that states have
implemented to transfer children from juvenile to criminal court to be tried as adults.
A. The Establishment of a Separate Juvenile Court System

Illinois enacted the first juvenile court in 1899.22 At the time, the leaders of the
juvenile justice reform movement 23 were appalled that the procedures and punishment
initially created for hardened adult criminals were forced upon children as well.24
The reformers “believed that society’s role was not to ascertain whether the child was
‘guilty’ or ‘innocent,’ but ‘What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had
best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career.’”25 The courts assumed that children were inherently good, and
22.

See Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).

23.

These reformers included the Chicago Bar Association, Superintendent Turner of the Chicago Reform
School, and women’s groups who lobbied the Illinois Legislature to get children out of institutions that
also housed adults and provide them with a separate juvenile court. See Sanford A. Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1187, 1222–24 (1970).

24.

Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.

25.

Id. (quoting Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 119–20 (1909)).
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that the state’s duty was to care for juveniles by providing treatment. 26 Therefore,
rehabilitation was the foremost concern of the juvenile court, and punishment was
abandoned.27
New York’s first juvenile court—the New York State Children’s Court—was
officially established in 1922.28 By 1925, every state save two had adopted legislation
creating a separate court to adjudicate juveniles.29 Juvenile courts initially exercised
jurisdiction over matters of child neglect and abuse, status offenses, and juvenile
delinquency for children below the age of sixteen.30 In the following decades, most
states increased the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction for delinquency cases
to sixteen or seventeen.31 Although the procedures differed among states, in general
the juvenile court system evolved into an informal process where juveniles were
adjudicated “delinquent” rather than “criminals.”32
The first juvenile courts did not strictly adhere to the rules of criminal procedure;
because the courts were created to promote the best interests of the child, proceedings
were less formal and less adversarial than those in criminal court.33 However, after a
series of Supreme Court cases starting in the mid-1960s, a more formalized juvenile
procedure, complete with due process protections, began to emerge. In the span of
four years, three groundbreaking Supreme Court cases firmly established the
principle that juveniles, like adults, are entitled to many of the rights provided under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
26. See id.; David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer out of the Juvenile Court, in The Changing

Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Criminal Court 13, 17–18
(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).

27.

Gault, 387 U.S. at 15–16.

28. Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York, 30 Pace L. Rev. 1061, 1069 (2010).

Before that time, New York had a long history of treating children separately from adults. In 1824, the
New York Society for the Prevention of Pauperism convinced the legislature to establish the New York
House of Refuge for the sole purpose of rehabilitating juveniles. Id. at 1066. In 1846, the legislature
made their commitment to the House of Refuge mandatory; children could no longer be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment with adult criminals. Id. at 1067. It was not until 1903, however, when the New
York State Legislature created separate children’s court parts, that “[a]ll cases involving the commitment
or trial of children . . . under the age of sixteen years, for any violation of law” were adjudicated in
separate courts. Id. at 1068 (quoting Act of May 6, 1903, 1903 N.Y. Laws 676, 677).

29. Id. at 1061. “The two 1925 ‘holdout’ states were Maine and Wyoming—both of which had joined the

‘ juvenile court’ bandwagon by the mid-1940s.” Id. at 1061 n.2.

30. Id. at 1064. During the early years of the juvenile courts, children age sixteen and above were considered

adults and were prosecuted through the criminal court system. Id. at 1061.

31.

Id. By 2012, thirty-eight states established an upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction of seventeen.
Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 21. Ten states set the maximum age at sixteen, and the two remaining
states (New York and North Carolina) have an upper age of fifteen, therefore prosecuting all juveniles
age sixteen and above in criminal court. See id.

32.

See Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New
York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 521, 522 (1988).

33.

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967). Juvenile court proceedings were often described as civil, as
opposed to criminal, and thus the procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants did not apply. See
id. at 17.
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First, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Kent v. United States that when a juvenile is
transferred from the jurisdiction of juvenile court to be tried as an adult in criminal
court, certain procedures are required in order to “satisfy the basic requirements of due
process and fairness.”34 Juveniles are entitled to a hearing and explanation of the reasons
behind the judge’s decision to waive jurisdiction before they can be transferred to
criminal court.35 One year later, in In re Gault,36 the Court concluded that although
juvenile courts have historically been deemed separate from criminal courts, with
different procedures and purposes,37 in situations where a juvenile’s liberty might be
“curtailed,” certain procedural protections are required in order to comport with the
Due Process Clause.38 In particular, youth in juvenile court are entitled to notice39 and
appointed counsel,40 and they enjoy the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and the right to cross-examine witnesses.41 The third due process reform
arrived in 1970 with In re Winship.42 The Supreme Court held that—regardless of
whether the defendant is a child proceeding in juvenile court or an adult standing trial
in criminal court—“the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.”43
B. New York and the 1962 Family Court Act

Consistent with the national trend, New York also began reforming its juvenile
justice system in the 1960s. The first New York Family Court was established under

34. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966). Kent was arrested at the age of sixteen, and the juvenile court judge ordered

him to stand trial in criminal court, which was authorized under Washington, D.C.’s Juvenile Court
Act. Id. at 543–44. The judge, however, made the decision to waive jurisdiction without first holding a
hearing to determine whether Kent would be better served by remaining in juvenile court. Id. at 546.
Although the text of the Juvenile Court Act required an investigation prior to the waiver of a juvenile
into adult court, the statute did not provide any standards to guide juvenile court judges in determining
when to waive a juvenile into adult proceedings. See id. at 547.

35.

Id. at 557. See infra note 88 for a list of the Supreme Court’s recommended factors and a discussion of
how these factors have been incorporated into various states’ statutes.

36. 387 U.S. at 1.
37.

See id. at 14 (“From the inception of the juvenile court system, wide differences have been tolerated—
indeed insisted upon—between the procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles.”).

38. Id. at 41.
39.

Id. at 33.

40. Id. at 41.
41.

See id. at 55–57. After In re Gault, youth adjudicated in juvenile court were entitled to almost the same
due process protections as criminal defendants, although the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized a
juvenile’s right to bail, indictment by grand jury, or a jury trial. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
555 (1966); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).

42.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

43.

Id. at 364–65.
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the 1962 Family Court Act.44 Under that statute, the family court possesses “exclusive
original jurisdiction” over abuse and neglect proceedings, child support proceedings,
paternity disputes, termination of parental rights, and juvenile delinquency
proceedings.45 Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s mandate, the Family Court Act
provides that in juvenile delinquency hearings, youth are entitled to notice of the
charges in the petition,46 appointment of counsel,47 and notice of their right to remain
silent and right to be represented by counsel.48
Under the Family Court Act, a juvenile delinquent was defined as a “person over
seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult,
would constitute a crime.”49 Children below the age of seven are not legally responsible
for their actions, and thus not subject to juvenile delinquency proceedings, while
youth ages sixteen and above are considered adults and prosecuted in criminal court.50
Less than two decades later, however, the boundary between juveniles and adults
began to blur with the enactment of the 1978 Juvenile Offender Act.
C. New York as a Leader in the National Punitive Trend

By the 1970s, New York City and many other urban cities experienced a surge of
violent crime committed by young people.51 Some attributed the crime wave to the
crack epidemic and the breakdown of the traditional family,52 whereas others blamed
gang violence and the pervasiveness of guns.53 Both the media and politicians warned
of a new generation of “superpredators.”54 In 1977, TIME Magazine ran a cover story
entitled The Youth Crime Plague, cautioning that “[a] new, remorseless, mutant juvenile

44. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 113 (McKinney 2012); Sobie, supra note 28, at 1071.
45.

Fam. Ct. Act § 115. For the remainder of this note, the terms family court and juvenile court will be
used interchangeably when referring to the New York juvenile justice system.

46. Id. § 320.4.
47.

Id. §§ 249, 320.2.

48. Id. § 320.3.
49. Id. § 712 (formerly (a)).
50. Alison Marie Grinnell, Note, Searching for a Solution: The Future of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law, 16

N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 635, 641 (2000).

51.

See Zimring, supra note 2, at 86 (“Given generally higher crime rates as well as large increases in the
population at risk, a substantial increase in violent youth crime was predictable. The increases that
occurred between 1960 and 1970 were, however, much greater than the most sophisticated demographic
projections would have predicted, because rates per 100,000 of major crimes of violence increased
dramatically.”); The Youth Crime Plague, supra note 2.

52.

The Youth Crime Plague, supra note 2.

53.

See Feld, supra note 10, at 109 (“The prevalence of guns in the hands of children, the apparent
randomness of gang violence and drive-by shootings, the disproportionate racial minority involvement
in homicides, and media depictions of callous youths’ gratuitous violence have inflamed public fear.”).

54. Id.
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seems to have been born, and there is no more terrifying figure in America today . . . .
Especially in ghettos of big cities, the violent youth is the king of the streets.”55
This concern about increased juvenile crime rates resulted in a growing rejection
of dual systems for adults and juveniles.56 Some studies found that rehabilitation was
ineffective because the majority of serious offenses were committed at the hands of
repeat offenders.57 Many critics believed that the dispositions for juvenile delinquents
were too lenient, and they proposed increasing punishment in an effort to deter
juveniles from committing crimes.58 The “public frustration with crime, fear of recent
rise in youth violence, and the racial characteristics of violent young offenders . . .
fueled the desire to ‘get tough’ and provided political impetus to prosecute larger
numbers of youths as adults.”59
In New York, the critical moment occurred in 1978, when fifteen-year-old Willie
Bosket shot and killed two strangers in the New York City subway.60 Bosket was
placed in juvenile detention for five years, which, at the time, was the maximum
punishment available under the Family Court Act.61 The public was irate.62 Two
weeks after Bosket was sentenced, the governor called a special legislative session.63
The New York State Legislature passed the Juvenile Justice Reform Amendment (the

55.

The Youth Crime Plague, supra note 2.

56. See Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 Crime & Just. 81, 83

(2000); Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on
Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 Law & Pol’y 77, 82–83 (1996); The Youth Crime
Plague, supra note 2.

57.

See, e.g., Steven P. Lab & John T. Whitehead, An Analysis of Juvenile Correctional Treatment, 34 Crime
& Delinq. 60 (1988) (concluding that there is no evidence that juvenile treatment and rehabilitation
reduces recidivism); James O. Robison & Gerald W. Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17
Crime & Delinq. 67 (1971) (contending that any decrease in recidivism rates is not due to treatment
but rather due to individual differences among offenders); William E. Wright & Michael C. Dixon,
Community Prevention and Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency: A Review of Evaluation Studies, 19 J. Res.
Crime & Delinq. 35 (1975) (discrediting reports concerning possible success of juvenile delinquency
prevention programs).

58. See Fagan, supra note 56, at 82 (“Proponents of deterrence and incapacitation policies criticized the

juvenile court as ineffective at controlling juvenile crime, particularly violent behavior.”); Singer &
McDowall, supra note 32, at 521–22.

59.

Feld, supra note 10, at 85.

60. See Simon I. Singer, Jeffrey Fagan & Akiva Liberman, The Reproduction of Juvenile Justice in Criminal

Court: A Case Study of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law, in The Changing Borders of Juvenile
Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Criminal Court 353, 353 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000); Michelle Haddad, Note, Catching Up: The Need for New York State to Amend Its
Juvenile Offender Law to Reflect Psychiatric, Constitutional and Normative National Trends over the Last
Three Decades, 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 455, 456 (2009); Secret, supra note 16.

61.

See Haddad, supra note 60; Fox Butterfield, All God’s Children: The Bosket Family and the
American Tradition of Violence 226 (Alfred A. Knoft ed., 1st ed. 1995).

62. See Secret, supra note 16; Haddad, supra note 60.
63. Feld, supra note 10, at 115; Butterfield, supra note 61, at 227.
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“Juvenile Offender Law”) just a few months later.64 The law created a new category of
juveniles called “juvenile offenders,” which are defined as thirteen- to fifteen-yearolds charged with a crime the legislature considered to be sufficiently serious to
require the child’s prosecution in criminal court.65 In effect, the new law “criminalized”
certain serious offenses committed by juveniles ages thirteen to fifteen.66 In addition,
the potential penalties for these offenses increased dramatically.67
New York was one of the first states to “crack down” on juvenile crime, but almost
every state followed New York’s lead within the next twenty years.68 In the 1990s,
many states increased the number of crimes for which juveniles could be prosecuted as
adults in criminal court.69 “To make transfer more expedient, they established offensebased, categorical, and absolute alternatives to individualized, offender-oriented waiver
proceedings in the juvenile court.”70 In addition, a number of states adopted a broader
approach by lowering the maximum age of original jurisdiction in juvenile court,71
which resulted in removing an entire category of juveniles to criminal court regardless
of the offense charged.72 By 1997, all states and the District of Columbia provided for
criminal prosecution of juveniles under certain circumstances.73
New York’s Juvenile Offender Act was the model transfer statute that many states
imitated in an effort to stem the tide of juvenile crime.74 Following is a brief introduction

64. See Singer, Fagan & Liberman, supra note 60, at 353–54; Haddad, supra note 60, at 456–57.
65.

See Cannon et al., supra note 18, at 8.

66. See Singer & McDowall, supra note 32, at 523–24.
67.

See id. (“[A] juvenile convicted of Murder 2 under the JO Law faces a minimum sentence of five to nine
years and a maximum of life. Prior to the law the same youth could have been committed to state
custody for a maximum of five years.”).

68. Bishop, supra note 56, at 84 (“Between 1992 and 1997, legislatures in forty-four states and the District

of Columbia enacted provisions to facilitate the [transfer] of young offenders to criminal court.”); Fagan,
supra note 56, at 79; Feld, supra note 10, at 116.

69. Fagan, supra note 56, at 79; Griffin et al., supra note 4, at iii. For example, California lowered the age

at which juvenile court judges can “waive,” or transfer, youth to criminal court from sixteen to fourteen.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Juvenile Justice: Juveniles Processed in Criminal Court
and Case Dispositions 1, 2 (1995) [hereinafter GAO Report], available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/230/221507.pdf. New Jersey added additional crimes to the list of offenses that, if committed by
a juvenile, may be waived to criminal court. Id. at 3.

70. Bishop, supra note 56, at 84.
71.

The maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction is the oldest age that a youth can still be adjudicated in
juvenile court. GAO Report, supra note 69, at 4. Any juvenile above that age is deemed an adult and
subject to criminal court jurisdiction. Id.

72. See Bishop, supra note 56, at 93; Robert O. Dawson, Waiver in Theory and Practice, in The Changing

Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Criminal Court 45, 47–48
(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).

73. Griffin et al., supra note 4, at 1.
74.

Feld, supra note 10, at 115–16 (“The 1978 New York excluded-offense law provided a model that other
states subsequently followed to simplify the process of trying juveniles as adults.”).
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to the various types of transfer laws implemented across the country from the late
1970s through the 1990s that authorize juveniles to be tried in criminal court.
D. Common Types of Transfer Laws

In this note, the term “transfer law” refers to any law that authorizes a juvenile to
be prosecuted and punished in the adult criminal justice system. These laws include
“legislative exclusion” provisions, which automatically transfer juveniles charged with
serious crimes to criminal court;75 “direct file” laws, which grant prosecutors the
discretion to file charges against juveniles either in criminal or juvenile court;76 and
“judicial waiver” laws, which can be mandatory, discretionary, or presumptive and
authorize juvenile court judges to waive their jurisdiction and transfer children to
criminal court.77
Depending on the type of transfer law a state has implemented, different
procedures apply. Under legislative exclusion and direct file statutes, if a juvenile is a
certain age and charged with a specific crime (usually one of a handful of serious
crimes enumerated in the statute), the prosecutor files the charges against the juvenile
offender in criminal court and the case proceeds from there; the child never appears
in juvenile court.78 However, if a juvenile lives in a state that has implemented a
judicial waiver statute, the child first appears in juvenile court79 where the state
attorney may then file a motion to transfer the juvenile to criminal court.80 The
judge holds an amenability hearing, at which both the state and the juvenile have an
opportunity to present evidence regarding the juvenile’s amenability to treatment
through the juvenile justice system.81 The judge considers a number of factors in
ruling on the motion, including the juvenile’s criminal history, the seriousness of the
offense charged, and the child’s rehabilitative potential.82 If the judge decides to
waive jurisdiction and transfer the child, the case then proceeds in criminal court.
Before 1970, most transfers from juvenile to criminal court were ordered on a caseby-case basis at the discretion of the juvenile court judge under a judicial waiver type of
transfer law.83 Now, a majority of states have implemented multiple mechanisms by
75. See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 2.
76. See id. at 2. Direct file laws are not the focus of this note, and thus will be mentioned only briefly.
77.

Id.

78. See id. at 4–6.
79. See id. at 2–4.
80. See id.
81.

See id.

82. See id.
83. See id. at 8. Although judicial waivers—the type of transfer provision at issue in Kent—have existed in

almost all states since the creation of the juvenile court system, the method was rarely used and juvenile
courts still possessed original jurisdiction over all juvenile offenses. See Bishop, supra note 56, at 82. It
was not until statutory exclusion and direct file laws were implemented that juvenile courts have been
divested of this original jurisdiction. See id. at 124.
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which to transfer juveniles to criminal court and do not rely on just one.84 The transfer
laws relevant to this note are discussed in more detail below.
		

1. Judicial Waiver

Judicial waivers are the oldest and most common transfer mechanism.85 As of
2009, forty-five states authorized juvenile court judges to waive their jurisdiction and
transfer juveniles to adult court for criminal prosecution.86 These judicial waiver
statutes can be discretionary, presumptive, or mandatory.87 Prior to transferring a
child to criminal court under a discretionary judicial waiver law, the juvenile court is
required to hold an amenability hearing and consider certain factors, such as the
circumstances surrounding each juvenile and the alleged crime.88
84. Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 3. New York, New Mexico, and Massachusetts are the only states that

have implemented statutory exclusion as the sole procedure to remove juveniles to criminal court. Id.
Judicial waiver is authorized in forty-five states, and thirty states employ judicial waiver plus at least one
other mechanism. Id. See infra appendix, for a complete list of each states’ transfer laws.

85. Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 2.
86. Id. Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, and New York are the only states that do not

allow some form of judicial waiver to transfer certain youth from juvenile to criminal court. Id. at 3.

87.

Id. at 2.

88. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966). A policy memo appended to the Supreme Court’s

opinion provided eight factors to be considered when the juvenile court judge is asked to transfer a
juvenile into the adult system:
(1)	T he seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection
of the community requires waiver.

(2)	W hether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated
or willful manner.

(3)	W hether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
(4)	T he prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which
a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment . . . .

(5)	T he desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a
crime in the [criminal court].
(6)	T he sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of
his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.

(7)	T he record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with
the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other
jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to
juvenile institutions.

(8)	The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by
the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.

Id. at 566–67 app. After the Kent decision, numerous states adopted some or all of the Supreme Court’s
recommended eight factors by incorporating them into their own juvenile court statutes. See GAO
Report, supra note 69, at 14; Griffin et al., supra note 4, at 3–4. The factors vary between states, but
they generally cover the nature of the offense and the individual juvenile’s age, maturity, criminal
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Presumptive waivers are a subset of judicial waivers. Under a presumptive waiver
process, certain juveniles—usually those of a particular age charged with a specific
offense—face a rebuttable presumption that they are not amenable to rehabilitation.89
Therefore, the juvenile bears the burden of proving amenability to treatment in order
to remain in juvenile court.90 Of the forty-five states that authorize judicial waivers,
fourteen permit a rebuttable presumption that transfer to criminal court is appropriate
for certain offenders.91
Finally, mandatory judicial waivers require a juvenile court judge to transfer the
child to criminal court if certain criteria are met (e.g., the child is of a certain age and
charged with a specific offense, or has a criminal record).92 Like discretionary and
presumptive judicial waivers, the case begins in juvenile court.93 The judge’s only
task, however, is to determine whether the criteria for transferring the child to
criminal court are met (that is, whether the juvenile is of the required age and
whether there is probable cause that the juvenile committed the offense charged).94
Once this decision is made, the juvenile is automatically transferred to criminal
court.95 In this way, mandatory judicial waiver laws function more as statutory
exclusion laws than as traditional, discretionary waivers.96

history, and amenability to treatment. Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 2. In addition, most states do
not dictate how the factors should be considered, e.g., the weight to be accorded each factor, and whether
all factors must be present to justify ordering a transfer or whether only a couple will suffice. Griffin
et al., supra note 4, at 3–4. There are a few exceptions to this general practice, however. In Michigan
and Minnesota, judges must give the most weight to two factors: the seriousness of the offense and the
juvenile’s prior record. Id. In Kentucky, at least two of the seven listed factors must be present to warrant
a transfer to criminal court. Id. In addition, the most important factors, according to a survey of judges
and prosecutors, are the gravity of the offense, the juvenile’s criminal record, and the juvenile’s
amenability to treatment. GAO Report, supra note 69, at 14.
89. Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 4.
90. Normally, under the more common judicial waiver, the state bears the burden of proving that the

juvenile is not amenable to treatment as a prerequisite to transferring the juvenile to adult court.
Dawson, supra note 72, at 57.

91.

Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 3. See infra appendix for a full list of these states.

92.

See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 4.

93.

Id.

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. Similar to statutory exclusion laws, under a mandatory judicial waiver the child is automatically

transferred to criminal court based only on the existence of statutory factors. See id. The juvenile court
judge does not have the discretion to permit the child to remain in juvenile court once the judge finds
these factors have been met. See id.
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2. Statutory Exclusion97

		

3. Reverse Waiver

New York’s Juvenile Offender Law is a type of exclusion statute. Under these
statutes, a juvenile is automatically arraigned in criminal court when specific statutory
criteria are met.98 For example, under New York’s Juvenile Offender Act, if a child is
thirteen years old and charged with second-degree murder, he is prosecuted in
criminal court.99 Unlike the judicial waiver system, in which the prosecutor must
request that the juvenile court judge waive jurisdiction and transfer the child to adult
criminal court, under a statutory exclusion regime the prosecutor merely files the
charging document with the criminal court.100
Under statutory exclusion, there is no transfer hearing because the criminal court
possesses original jurisdiction and the youth never appears before a juvenile court
judge.101 Thus, legislative exclusion effectively circumvents the due process
requirements the Supreme Court established in Kent—a pre-transfer hearing,
weighing of factors, and individualized consideration of the particular circumstances
surrounding each case—and automatically places juvenile offenders in criminal court
based solely on certain facts (usually their age and offense). As of 2009, twenty-nine
states have enacted some form of exclusion statute.102
Some states, including New York, also allow reverse waivers (often called
removals), which authorize criminal court judges to remove a child’s case to juvenile
court under some circumstances.103 Usually, reverse waivers are available only in
situations where the juvenile court did not already have an opportunity to determine
the suitability of the transfer to criminal court.104 States that authorize reverse waivers
require the criminal court judge to consider the Kent factors, or some combination of
similar factors, to determine whether removal to juvenile court is appropriate.105 Of
97.

This transfer mechanism is also referred to as legislative waiver. For the sake of clarity, this note will use
the term “waiver” only when referring to judicial waivers or “reverse” waivers, which are discussed infra
Part II.D.3.

98. See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 2.
99. See discussion infra Part II.E.1.
100. See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 4–6.
101. See Griffin et al., supra note 4, at 8.
102. Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 3. See infra appendix, for a full list of the states that have enacted

statutory exclusion statutes.

103. Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 3, 7. See infra appendix for a list of states with a reverse waiver statute.
104. See Bishop, supra note 56, at 94. For example, reverse waivers are usually available when the juvenile was

automatically indicted in criminal court under a legislative exclusion statute or when the prosecutor
directly filed in criminal court. However, in three states—Connecticut, Kentucky, and Tennessee—
reverse waivers are authorized even though the state has not implemented statutory exclusion or direct
file laws. See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 3.

105. See Bishop, supra note 56, at 94.
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the forty-three states that authorize automatic transfers to criminal court, either
through direct file, statutory exclusion, or mandatory judicial waiver laws, twentyfour also provide some form of reverse waiver back to juvenile court.106 The remaining
nineteen states implement at least one transfer mechanism that circumvents an
amenability hearing in the juvenile courts but fails to provide any later hearing to
determine the juvenile’s suitability to proceed in criminal court.107 In those states,
“transfer decisions . . . are not subject to any sort of judicial review: they are absolute.”108
		

4. “Wholesale” Transfer

During the time when fear of juvenile “superpredators” was sweeping the nation,
some states, in addition to implementing specific transfer laws, also lowered the
maximum age of original jurisdiction in juvenile court.109 Although a state’s decision
to change the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction is not technically a transfer law,
it is another method of effectively transferring a whole group of juveniles to adult
court based entirely on their age.110 If a juvenile commits an offense after reaching
the boundary age for his jurisdiction, he will automatically be processed in criminal
court without any juvenile court involvement; he is deemed an adult under the laws
of his state.111 Typically, once a juvenile reaches eighteen, he or she will no longer be
adjudicated in juvenile court.112 However, in ten states the line between juvenile and
criminal court jurisdiction is a child’s seventeenth birthday and in two states—New
York and North Carolina—criminal court jurisdiction begins at age sixteen.113
E. New York’s Juvenile Offender Law in Detail
		

1. Automatic Transfer of All “Juvenile Offenders” to Criminal Court

By the late 1970s, the New York State Legislature decided to implement a transfer
law for its own juveniles. The 1978 Juvenile Offender Act (the “Act”) drastically
changed the juvenile justice system in New York, amending the New York Family
Court Act, Penal Law, and Criminal Procedure Law.114 The Act modified the
definition of juvenile delinquent to remove juveniles between the ages of thirteen and
106. See infra appendix.
107. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts,

Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. See infra appendix.

108. Bishop, supra note 56, at 94.
109. Id. at 93; Dawson, supra note 72, at 47–48.
110. See Bishop, supra note 56, at 93.
111. Dawson, supra note 72, at 47.
112. See id.
113. See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 21. For a list of the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction for

each state, see infra appendix.

114. Haddad, supra note 60, at 460.
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fifteen, charged with certain serious offenses, to adult criminal court where they will
be subject to criminal sanctions.115 The Act effectively deprives the juvenile court of
original jurisdiction over these juveniles, requiring that they be automatically prosecuted
in criminal court.116 This new category of juvenile, called a “juvenile offender,” includes
thirteen-year-olds charged with second degree murder or a sexually motivated felony,
and fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds charged with murder, kidnapping, arson, assault,
manslaughter, rape, criminal sexual act, aggravated sexual abuse, burglary, arson,
robbery, possession of a machine gun or firearm on school grounds, an attempt to
commit murder or kidnapping, or a sexually motivated felony.117
		

2. Provisions for Removal to Family Court

Because juveniles between thirteen and fifteen who are charged with a “juvenile
offense” will automatically be placed in criminal court, the Act also provides
opportunities during various stages of the criminal proceeding for a juvenile offender
to be removed to family court “if it becomes apparent in a particular case that such
treatment would be more appropriate than continuation of criminal prosecution.”118
Prior to trial, upon the motion of any party,119 the criminal court judge may order the
child’s removal to family court if he or she concludes that removal would be “in the
interests of justice.”120 If the district attorney does not consent to the juvenile’s
115. The revised definition provides that a juvenile delinquent is

a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age, who, having committed an act
that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, (a) is not criminally responsible for
such conduct by reason of infancy, or (b) is the defendant in an action ordered removed
from a criminal court to the family court.

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2006) (emphasis added).

116. See In re Raymond G., 93 N.Y.2d 531, 535 (1999) (“[T]he Legislature divested the Family Court of

original jurisdiction over such acts in favor of original jurisdiction in the adult criminal justice system.”);
see also In re Elizabeth R., 646 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep’t 1997) (holding that family court does not possess
concurrent jurisdiction with criminal court).

117. N.Y. Penal Law § 10.00(18) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 1.20(42) (McKinney 2006).

As an important side note, the label “juvenile offender” should not be confused with the term “juvenile
delinquent,” which refers to any juvenile under the age of sixteen who has been adjudicated delinquent in
juvenile court. See Fam. Ct. Act § 301.2(1). In addition, the law also recognizes a “youthful offender”:
an adult between the ages of sixteen and nineteen, or a juvenile offender (a juvenile between the age of
thirteen and fifteen charged with a serious offense) who is eligible for a lighter sentence due to his age
and crime. See Crim. Proc. § 720.10.

118. Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 548 (1979); Crim. Proc. §§ 180.75(4)–(5), 210.43(1). This procedure is

often referred to as “reverse waiver.” See supra Part II.D.3.

119. If the defense attorney requests removal to family court, he or she would likely argue that removal is

appropriate because the victim was not harmed, the defendant’s participation in the offense was minor,
this is the defendant’s first offense, the defendant is not a danger to the community, and/or the defendant
is amenable to treatment in juvenile court. See, e.g., People v. Gregory C., 602 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494–97
(Sup. Ct. Erie Cnty. 1993); People v. Martinez, 412 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279–81 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1978).

120. Crim. Proc. §§ 180.75(4), 210.43(1)(a)–(b). To determine whether a removal to family court is in the

interests of justice, the judge must consider specific criteria:
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removal to family court, the judge has the discretion to order the removal sua
sponte121 unless the juvenile is charged with murder, rape, criminal sexual act, or an
armed felony.122
The statutory scheme also provides additional opportunities for removal to family
court. For example, the grand jury can decide to remove the case instead of indicting
the juvenile,123 and the district attorney may recommend removal to family court
prior to the juvenile pleading guilty.124 Finally, upon a motion by the district attorney,
a juvenile may be removed to family court following conviction of a juvenile offense
in criminal court.125 The verdict will be set aside and replaced with a juvenile

(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;

(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial;
(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;

(e)	the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the
offense;

(f)	the impact of a removal of the case to the family court on the safety or welfare of the
community;

(g)	t he impact of a removal of the case to the family court upon the confidence of the
public in the criminal justice system;
(h)	where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or victim with
respect to the motion; and

(i)	any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction in the criminal
court would serve no useful purpose.

Id. §§ 180.75(4), 210.43(1)–(2). Note the similarity between the statutory factors provided for removal
to juvenile court and the eight Kent factors that juvenile court judges must consider before transferring
a juvenile to adult court. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
121. Crim. Proc. § 210.43(1)–(2); Vega, 47 N.Y.2d at 552 (interpreting the statutory scheme to allow both

criminal court and superior court judges to remove the juvenile to family court without the district
attorney’s consent if removal would be in the interests of justice).

122. See Crim. Proc. § 210.43 (1)(a)–(b). In that case, the district attorney must consent to removal to family

court and the judge must find: “(i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which
the crime was committed; or (ii) . . . [that] the defendant’s participation was relatively minor . . . ; or (iii)
possible deficiencies in proof of the crime” before the juvenile’s removal to family court is proper. Id. §§
180.75(4), 210.43(1). This finding is in addition to the determination that the removal is in the best
interests of justice. Id. § 210.43(1)(b). If the judge decides to remove the case from criminal to family court,
he or she must state the factors that led to this determination. Id. § 180.75(6)(a). In addition, if the district
attorney’s consent is required to remove the action to family court (i.e., where certain serious crimes are
charged), he must also state the reasons for his decision on the record. Id. § 180.75(6)(b).

123. See id. § 190.71.
124. See id. § 220.10(g)(iii).
125. See id. § 330.25. This provision applies only if the juvenile has not been convicted of murder, and

requires the judge to find that the removal is in the “interests of justice.” Id. § 330.25(1). The same nine
factors used to determine whether removal to family court prior to trial is in the “interests of justice”
apply here as well. Id.
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delinquency fact determination.126 The juvenile will then be removed to family court
for sentencing.127
Although multiple opportunities for removal to family court are available under
the statute, only the first option—removal prior to trial—authorizes the juvenile
defendant, rather than a third party, to request removal.128 In addition, when a
defendant moves for removal, the criminal court is not obligated to hold a removal
hearing.129 The New York Court of Appeals stated that “under the present scheme it
will only be in the unusual or exceptional case that removal will be proper, and thus
a hearing will be necessary only if it appears for some special reason that removal
would be appropriate in the particular case.”130
		

3. Types and Length of Sentences

The New York Juvenile Offender Law also modified the types and length of
sentences a juvenile can receive. Before the law went into effect, the maximum
punishment for a juvenile under the age of sixteen for any offense was five years in a
secure facility.131 Upon the enactment of the Juvenile Offender Law, the sentence for
one of the more serious juvenile offenses is a minimum of five to nine years and a
maximum of life imprisonment.132 Lighter sentences may be available if the juvenile
is eligible for youthful offender treatment, which is “an ameliorative mechanism that
can avoid some of the harsh results [that] follow a finding of guilt of a criminal
offense . . . . It seals the records of the offender and limits the term of incarceration.”133
126. Id. § 330.25(3).
127. See id.
128. Compare Crim. Proc. §§ 180.75(4)–(5), 210.43(1) (allowing the defendant to file a removal motion

prior to trial), with id. § 220.10(g)(iii) (allowing the district attorney to request removal to family court
prior to the juvenile pleading guilty), and id. § 330.25 (allowing removal following a conviction of a
juvenile offense upon motion by the district attorney and with the consent of the judge).

129. See Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 553 (1979). 541, 557 (1966). The court concluded that because the

legislature decided that juveniles who commit these offenses are criminally responsible for their actions,
courts should not question this legislative judgment. Id. at 555; see also People v. Charles M., 731
N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (4th Dep’t 2001).

130. Vega, 47 N.Y.2d at 553.
131. See Singer & McDowall, supra note 32, at 524.
132. Id. at 523 tbl.1. For a complete list of all juvenile offenses and the corresponding sentencing range, see

Cannon et al., supra note 18, at 31 tbl.3. If sentenced to a term of incarceration past his twenty-first
birthday, the juvenile will spend the first part of the sentence in a secure juvenile facility, and then
transfer to an adult prison for the remainder of his sentence. See N.Y. Penal Law § 70.20(4) (McKinney
2003) (“[A] juvenile offender, or a juvenile offender who is adjudicated a youthful offender and given an
indeterminate or a definite sentence, shall be committed to the custody of the commissioner of the
office of children and family services who shall arrange for the confinement of such offender in secure
facilities of the office.”); Singer & McDowall, supra note 32, at 524.

133. People v. Williams, 418 N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (Cnty. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. 1979). A juvenile offender will be

eligible for youthful offender sentencing under two circumstances. First, if the judge finds that “the
interest of justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal record and
by not imposing an indeterminate term of imprisonment of more than four years,” the judge may, at his
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Youthful offender sentences range from a term of imprisonment—usually much less
than the term available under the juvenile offender sentencing statute134 —to
conditional or unconditional discharge.135
F. A Step Back: The Growing Rejection of Punitive Measures
		

1.	An Emerging Consensus against Severe Punishments for Juveniles

Within the past five years, states have started to turn away from the punitive
measures that have been the hallmark of transfer statutes over the last thirty years.
According to a recent New York Times article, “[a] generation after record levels of
youth crime spurred a nationwide movement to prosecute more teenagers as adults, a
consensus is emerging that many young delinquents have been mishandled by the
adult court system.”136 One indication of this growing consensus is that many states
have initiated a campaign to increase the maximum age of juvenile court
jurisdiction.137 In 2007, the Connecticut legislature passed a bill to increase the age
of adulthood from sixteen to eighteen by 2012.138 In addition, legislators in
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and North Carolina have introduced bills to increase the
age of adulthood.139 New York may soon be the only state that still requires all
juveniles age sixteen and above to be prosecuted in criminal court, regardless of the
offense charged or any mitigating circumstances.
Another possible sign of this movement toward rehabilitation and away from
punishment is the lack of any major expansion in transfer laws since 2000.140 Between
1986 and 1997, legislatures in almost every state amended their juvenile codes to
increase the number of juveniles that could be tried in criminal court.141 Over the
past decade, however, no new laws have been enacted to increase the number of
discretion, deem the juvenile a youthful offender. Crim. Proc. § 720.20(1)(a). Second, if the youth has
not previously been convicted of a crime, the judge must find he is a youthful offender. Id. § 720.20(1)
(b). If the judge believes that the above criteria apply, the juvenile’s conviction is vacated and replaced
with a youthful offender finding. Id. § 720.20(3).
134. The sentence varies depending on the underlying conviction and may range from a minimum term of

one-year imprisonment to a maximum term of four years. See Penal §§ 60.02(2), 70.00(2)(e). In the
alternative, if the court believes that “a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be
unduly harsh to impose an indeterminate or determinate sentence, the court may impose a definite
sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.” Id. § 70.00(4).

135. See id. §§ 60.02(2), 65.05(1)(a), 65.20(1).
136. Secret, supra note 16.
137. See id.
138. See 2007 Conn. Acts 4 (Reg. Sess.); 2009 Conn. Acts 7 (Reg. Sess.); Griffin et al., supra note 18, at

21.

139. See Secret, supra note 16.
140. See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 9.
141. Id. During this period, the number of states authorizing statutory exclusion increased from twenty to

thirty-eight. Id. In addition, the number of states that permit prosecutorial direct filing jumped from
seven to fifteen. Id.
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juveniles that can be transferred to criminal court.142 In addition, the number of cases
that have been judicially waived to criminal court peaked in 1994 and has since
fallen by thirty-five percent.143 In 2007, a national report estimated that juvenile
courts waived their original jurisdiction in less than one percent of all delinquency
petitions.144 Of course, it is difficult to determine from the scarce data if the decrease
in judicial waivers is due to juvenile court judges’ unwillingness to transfer juveniles
to criminal court or rather results from an increase in the use of more efficient types
of transfer mechanisms.145 There are “striking variations in individual states’
propensity to try juveniles as adults,” and therefore drawing conclusions from the
existing data is difficult.146 It should also be noted that although states are not
creating new transfer mechanisms, they are also not amending their current
procedures to funnel more youth back into the juvenile justice system.147
		

2.	The Supreme Court Weighs In: Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and
Miller v. Alabama

In addition to individual states’ reconsideration of their punitive approach to
juvenile justice, three recent Supreme Court cases—Roper v. Simmons,148 Graham v.
Florida,149 and Miller v. Alabama150 —have declared certain extreme punishments for
juveniles unconstitutional.
In 2005, the Court held in Roper v. Simmons that sentencing juveniles to death for
crimes they committed while under the age of eighteen violates the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.151 The Court recognized a
growing national consensus against such punishment, noting that thirty states prohibit
the death penalty for juveniles and the additional twenty states rarely sentence juveniles
to death.152 In addition, the Court identified three differences between juveniles and
adults that led to its conclusion that juveniles are not “among the worst offenders” and
142. Id. at 9.
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id.
145. Id. National data regarding the frequency of statutory exclusion and direct file transfers is severely

lacking. Id. at 14. Only thirteen states report all of their juvenile transfers to criminal court, and
fourteen states do not report transfers at all. Id. at 14–15.

146. Id. at 17.
147. Id. at 9.
148. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
149. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
150. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
151. 543 U.S. at 568.
152. Id. at 564. The majority also thought it was significant that since Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361

(1989), a Supreme Court case holding that execution of juveniles between ages sixteen and eighteen
does not violate the Eighth Amendment, no state had reinstated the death penalty for juveniles. Roper,
543 U.S. at 566.

614

N

VOLUME 57 | 2012/13

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

thus should not be subject to the death penalty.153 First, juveniles lack maturity and a
developed sense of responsibility, which often leads to rash decisionmaking.154 Second,
juveniles are more susceptible to outside influences and peer pressure.155 Third,
juveniles’ characters are more malleable than adults as their “personality traits are more
transitory, less fixed.”156 The Court concluded that these characteristics prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles under eighteen.157
The invalidation of especially harsh punishments for juveniles was recently
expanded in 2010 when the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida that sentencing
juveniles to life imprisonment without parole for nonhomicide crimes also violates
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.158 The Court first
considered various states’ statutes and practices and determined that a national
consensus had emerged disapproving of the sentence for this specific class of
offenders.159 The Court next cited Roper’s assertion that juveniles are less culpable
than adults due to their immaturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and
vulnerability to peer pressure.160 Because of juveniles’ decreased culpability, the
Court concluded that they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.161
Most recently, in June 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama
that automatic life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicides also violates the
Eighth Amendment,162 effectively expanding Graham to include juvenile homicide
offenders subject to mandatory sentences. Justice Kagan, writing for the majority,
noted that Roper and Graham both established three fundamental differences between
juveniles and adults that are important for the purpose of sentencing: (1) juveniles are
less mature, which leads to impulsive actions and reckless decisionmaking;163 (2)
children are more vulnerable to pressure from their peers and family, and “have
limited ‘control over their environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves
from horrific, crime-producing settings;”164 and (3) juveniles’ characters are not well
153. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
154. Id. (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 569–70.
157. Id. at 570–71.
158. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
159. See id. at 2024. The Court noted that six states prohibit the sentence of life without the possibility of

parole for juveniles, and that seven states allow the sentence, but only for homicides. Id. at 2023. Of the
thirty-seven states that do permit the sentence for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes, the
sentence is rarely imposed. Id.

160. Id. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
161. Id. In addition, life without parole is even harsher for juveniles than for adults, as they will likely spend

many more years behind bars than their adult counterparts. Id. at 2028.

162. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
163. Id. at 2464.
164. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
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formed, and therefore their traits may be temporary and are “less likely to be ‘evidence
of irretrievable depravity.’”165 Further, because life without parole for juveniles is
comparable to the death sentence for adults, these life sentences require the same
individualized sentencing that the death penalty requires.166 This includes taking into
account an offender’s age and character, his or her criminal record, the circumstances
surrounding the offense, and other potential mitigating factors.167
It appears that the juvenile justice system has come full circle. The first juvenile
court was established in 1899 to provide treatment and protect juveniles from harsh
criminal court sentences. Due process protections for juveniles were recognized in
the 1960s, followed by increased punitive measures starting in the 1970s and
continuing through the end of the twentieth century. In the past decade, however,
the Supreme Court and some state legislatures have started to reject severe
punishments for juveniles and are moving back toward the original values of juvenile
justice system: protecting and rehabilitating children. The next section examines
how, in this environment, New York’s Juvenile Offender Law is quickly becoming
outdated and unjustifiable.
III.	NEW YORK HAS FALLEN BEHIND THE RECENT NATIONAL MOVEMENT AGAINST
PUNISHMENT FOR JUVENILES

The New York Juvenile Offender Law does not reflect recent trends in juvenile
justice. The law’s automatic transfer provisions do not allow for the consideration of
a juvenile’s decreased culpability or amenability to treatment through the juvenile
justice system. By imposing criminal sanctions on juveniles, the law disregards both
the Supreme Court and numerous states’ recent rejection of harsh punishments for
juveniles. Additionally, studies show that the Juvenile Offender Law does not reduce
juvenile crime rates and punishes minority males more harshly than other groups.
For these reasons, the Juvenile Offender Law is no longer a viable solution to address
juvenile delinquency in New York.
A.	The Viability of the New York Juvenile Offender Law after Roper, Graham, and
Miller

The Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller revisited the same key concepts: the
developmental differences between juveniles and adults, including their lack of
maturity and susceptibility to outside influences;168 juveniles’ decreased culpability as
a result of these fundamental differences;169 juveniles’ greater ability to reform than
165. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
166. See id. at 2467–69.
167. See id.
168. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (noting that juveniles lack maturity and a developed

sense of responsibility, are more susceptible to peer pressure, and that their “personality traits are more
transitory, less fixed”); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.

169. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
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adults;170 and the country’s changing beliefs about the purpose of the juvenile justice
system and the appropriate punishment for children (often called our “evolving
standards of decency”).171
This note argues that the New York Juvenile Offender Law, drafted in 1978 and
unchanged since, does not reflect these concepts. The Juvenile Offender Law requires
juveniles of a certain age charged with a specific offense to be automatically
transferred to criminal court, without considering their maturity, their environment,
the circumstances surrounding their offense, and ultimately their amenability to
treatment through the juvenile justice system. The law ignores the fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult offenders, such as their impulsive nature and
lack of maturity, as well as their capacity to change. These differences have been
repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court and support the position that children
should not be subject to the same procedures and punishment created for adult
offenders.172 Furthermore, the Juvenile Offender Law disregards the nation’s evolving
standards of decency and moral disapproval of harsh punishments for juveniles.
		

1.	The Juvenile Offender Law Ignores the Fundamental Differences between
Juveniles and Adults and the Resulting Decreased Culpability of Juvenile
Offenders

Numerous behavioral science studies have concluded that adolescents share
certain developmental and psychological characteristics that would traditionally
make them less criminally responsible than adults. “Unlike competence, which
concerns an individual’s ability to serve as a defendant during trial or adjudication,
culpability turns on the offender’s state of mind at the time of the offense, including
factors that would mitigate . . . the degree of responsibility.”173 Recent studies indicate
that adolescents are less mature than their adult counterparts.174 Juveniles are also
more likely to succumb to peer pressure and other external influences when compared

170. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (“From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of

a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be
reformed.”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.

171. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (examining “the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States;

the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward
abolition of the practice”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024 (concluding that a national consensus against
juvenile life without parole for nonhomicide crimes has emerged); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (noting that
the concept of proportionality should be viewed “according to the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).

172. See supra text accompanying notes 168–71.
173. MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile

Justice, Issue Brief 3: Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence 1 [hereinafter MacArthur
Foundation Research Network], available at http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue_brief_3.pdf.

174. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on

Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 137, 139 (1997).
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to adults.175 In addition to following a crowd, this “malleability” also means that
juveniles are better suited to rehabilitative programs than adults.176 Juveniles are also
more likely to act impulsively to attain an immediate reward rather than fully
considering the long-term consequences of their conduct.177 Furthermore, research
shows that adolescents take more risks than adults because, due to their inexperience,
they are less aware of the risks associated with a certain activity.178
The Supreme Court has concluded that juveniles are not as culpable as adults due
to these characteristics179 and that therefore they should not be subject to comparable
procedures and punishment. In Roper, Justice Kennedy explained that “[i]t is difficult
even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”180 And in Miller, Justice Kagan stated
that “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both
lessen[] a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhance[] the prospect that, as the years go by
and neurological development occurs, his ‘deficiencies will be reformed.’”181
		

2.	The Juvenile Offender Law Disregards the Nation’s Evolving Standards of
Decency and Moral Disapproval of Strict Punishments for Juveniles

In Roper, Graham, and Miller, the Court explored the nation’s “evolving standards
of decency” to determine whether the specific punishment at issue violated the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.182 The Court often
looks to various states’ statutes and practices—the “objective indicia of society’s
standards,” as the Court calls them—to determine whether a national consensus has

175. See id. at 162; MacArthur Foundation Research Network, supra note 173, at 3 (noting that not

only may peers coerce juveniles into taking certain actions, but the indirect desire to be accepted by
peers may lead juveniles to take risks they would otherwise avoid).

176. Bishop, supra note 56, at 83.
177. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 174, at 164. The prefrontal cortex, which affects the ability to “delay

impulsive or emotional reactions sufficiently to allow for rational consideration of appropriate responses,”
continues to develop throughout adolescence. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental
Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 793, 812 (2005); MacArthur
Foundation Research Network, supra note 173, at 2; see generally Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley,
Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, 7
Psychol. Sci. Pub. Int. 1 (2006).

178. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 174, at 163 (noting that juveniles are more likely than adults to engage in

many risky behaviors, such as unprotected sex and driving under the inf luence); MacArthur
Foundation Research Network, supra note 173, at 3; see generally Reyna & Farley, supra note 177.

179. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010);

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).

180. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
181. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. 551 at 570)).
182. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463.
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formed against the sentence.183 In Roper, the Court found it significant that thirty
states abolished the death sentence for juveniles.184 The Graham Court noted that
although only eleven states banned the sentence of life imprisonment without parole
for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes, the fact that the majority of the
remaining states rarely if ever imposed the punishment was also noteworthy.185 And
in Miller, Justice Kagan noted that although twenty-nine states allowed for the
mandatory sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders, the fact that the
majority of states do not have separate penalty provisions for juveniles, and thus
merely apply the same sentences to juveniles proceeding in adult court as they do to
adults, makes it impossible to determine whether a legislature has endorsed this
specific punishment for juveniles.186 Therefore, the fact that twenty-nine states
require the sentence in some circumstances does not indicate that a consensus has
formed in favor of the punishment.
Applying this analysis to the Juvenile Offender Law, it is apparent that the law’s
punishments for juveniles—including life imprisonment for thirteen- and fourteenyear-olds convicted of murder—are also inconsistent with a growing national
consensus against severe penalties for juvenile offenders. Similar to New York, transfer
statutes in forty-nine states allow juveniles who are thirteen and fourteen years old to
be prosecuted in criminal court for murder.187 Of those, forty-three states’ statutes
authorize the judge to sentence the thirteen- or fourteen-year-old to life imprisonment
following a murder conviction.188 However, only eighteen states are currently
incarcerating thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds sentenced to life.189 In addition, out of
2594 juveniles across the country who are currently incarcerated for life, only seventyone were between the ages of thirteen and fourteen when they committed homicide.190
Following Graham’s reasoning, the fact that forty-three states authorize the sentence
183. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (concluding that a national consensus against

juvenile life without parole for nonhomicide crimes has emerged); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (noting that
the concept of proportionality should be viewed “according to the ‘evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society’”).

184. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
185. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
186. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2473.
187. This data was compiled from statistics found in Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 apps. I–III; Miller v. State,

63 So.3d 676, 687–88 & nn.3–4 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); Griffin et al., supra note 18; and State-byState Legal Resource Guide, Univ. of S.F. Sch. of Law, http://www.usfca.edu/law/jlwop/resource_guide
(last visited Nov. 12, 2011); Adam Liptak & Lisa Faye Petak, Juvenile Killers in Jail for Life Seek a
Reprieve, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 2011, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/
us/21juvenile.html?scp=1&sq=graham%20juvenile%20life%20imprisonment&st=cse.

188. See Griffin et al., supra note 18.
189. See id.
190. See Liptak & Petak, supra note 187. One issue with these figures is that there is very little data regarding

the number of juveniles transferred to criminal courts and subsequently convicted of homicide. See
Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 12–17. It is possible that the low number of life sentences for thirteenand fourteen-year-olds is a result of their low rate of conviction for homicide.
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of life imprisonment for thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds convicted of homicide, yet
only eighteen states actually implement that punishment, objectively indicates that
society is starting to reject this harsh punishment.
Another sign of a national consensus against these severe sentences for young
adolescents is the fact that states are now starting to increase the age of criminal
responsibility for juveniles. In Roper, Justice Kennedy found it significant that a
number of states abolished the death penalty for juveniles, thereby indicating a
consistent trend against the practice.191 By increasing the maximum age of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction, states are removing entire categories of juveniles from
the criminal system and placing them back in juvenile courts, where dispositions
tend to be more lenient and allow for a wider range of alternatives to incarceration.192
Although these recent changes do not necessarily indicate that states are rejecting
harsh sentences for young offenders, since all states allow the transfer of juveniles to
criminal court for particularly serious crimes,193 there is at least a growing presumption
that children should remain in juvenile court and that severe punitive measures
should be a last resort, rather than the first choice.
B. Additional Reasons to Revise the Juvenile Offender Law

In addition to the Supreme Court’s rationales for abolishing certain severe
penalties for juveniles, there are several other reasons for concluding that the Juvenile
Offender Law is no longer practicable. At least three additional factors demonstrate
the need to amend the Juvenile Offender Law and abolish its harsh punitive measures
for juveniles. First, the prediction that juvenile “superpredators” would take over the
country has not come to pass. On the contrary, the violent juvenile crime rate has
decreased.194 Second, studies have demonstrated that, rather than having the intended
deterrent effect, punitive measures actually lead to an increase in juvenile recidivism.195
Third, various studies indicate that transfer laws may disproportionately target and
punish minority males.196 These factors, when applied to the Juvenile Offender Law,
demonstrate that New York’s approach to juvenile justice is outdated and must be
revisited.197
191. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
192. See Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, Charting a New Course: A Blueprint for

Transforming Juvenile Justice in New York State 22–23 (2009), available at http://www.vera.org/
download?file=2944/Charting-a-new-course-A-blueprint-for-transforming-juvenile-justice-in-NewYork-State.pdf.

193. See infra appendix.
194. See Fox Butterfield, After a Decade, Juvenile Crime Begins to Drop, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1996, at A1; see

generally Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the
Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. Econ. Perspectives 163 (2004).

195. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
196. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
197. Although beyond the scope of this note, it should be briefly mentioned that the New York statutory

scheme also disregards prevailing international standards. For example, Article 37(b) of the United
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1.	The Juvenile Offender Law Does Not Reduce Juvenile Crime Rates and
Recidivism

One factor leading to the popularity of transfer laws was the belief that juvenile
court was ineffective and, that to truly deter juveniles from committing crimes, states
must treat them like adults by transferring them to criminal court and increasing
punishments.198 However, studies focusing on the Juvenile Offender Law indicate
that trying juveniles in criminal court not only fails to reduce crime and recidivism
rates, but that the rates may actually be increasing after implementation of the law.
One study, conducted by Jeffrey Fagan and published in 1996, found that recidivism
rates were “significantly lower” for juveniles sentenced in juvenile court than those
sentenced in criminal court.199 Fagan found that juveniles charged with robbery and
tried in criminal court had re-arrest rates “over 50% higher than robbery offenders in
juvenile court.”200 Fagan concluded that, “[r]ather than affording greater community
protection, the higher recidivism rates for the criminal cohort suggest that public
safety was in fact compromised by adjudication in criminal court. Moreover, the data
hints that increasing the severity of criminal court sanctions may actually enhance
the likelihood of recidivism.”201 The study calls into question one of the principles on
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “The arrest, detention or imprisonment of
a child . . . shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 37(b), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%201577/
v1577.pdf. Under the Juvenile Offender Law, however, a convicted juvenile offender would most likely
be imprisoned unless the court finds the juvenile eligible for youthful offender status. See N.Y. Penal
Law § 60.10 (McKinney 2003). A 2010 report found that of the 926 juvenile offenders in New York
City sentenced in criminal court from 2005 to 2008, 54% received a term of imprisonment. Cannon et
al., supra note 18, at 8. In addition, a national study, which included data from six New York counties,
shows that of the approximately 4700 juveniles convicted of felonies in criminal courts in 1998, 64%
were sentenced to jail or prison. Gerard A. Rainville & Steven K. Smith, U.S. Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Juvenile Felony Defendants in Criminal Courts 1
(2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jfdcc98.pdf. The average prison sentence was
approximately ninety months. Id.
198. See discussion supra Part II.C.
199. Fagan, supra note 56, at 77. The study compared the “severity, certainty and celerity of sanctions for

fifteen- and sixteen-year-old adolescents charged with robbery and burglary in juvenile court in New
Jersey with identical offenders in matched communities in New York State whose cases are adjudicated
in criminal court.” Id. at 79. The author studied 800 juveniles in four matched counties in New York and
New Jersey. Id. at 84. The counties were matched for crime rates and other socio-economic factors,
including housing characteristics, transportation, social institutions, media, culture, and employment,
in order to minimize differences and increase the validity of the study. Id. at 86.

200. Id. at 93. In addition, the failure rate—the time elapsed between the juvenile’s release from incarceration

and arrest for a new offense—for robbery offenders was 392 days for juveniles sentenced in criminal
court versus 631 days for those adjudicated in juvenile court. Id. at 94.

201. Id. at 100. The Fagan study also found that the difference in the severity of sanctions in juvenile and

criminal courts was statistically significant. Almost half of the juveniles convicted in criminal court of
either robbery or burglary were sentenced to a term of incarceration, whereas only 18.3% and 23.8% of
juveniles adjudicated in juvenile court for robbery and burglary, respectively, were sentenced to a juvenile
facility. Id. at 90 & tbl.2.
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which transfer laws were based: Adolescents will respond to the intended deterrent
effects of increased severity and certainty of punishment by committing fewer crimes.
In addition, a study published in 1988 found that the increased punitive measures
implemented under the Juvenile Offender Law had no effect on juvenile homicide or
assault rates. 202 The authors studied monthly juvenile arrests from 1974 through
1984, both before and after the Juvenile Offender Law went into effect in 1978. 203
The authors expected that if the law deterred serious juvenile offenders, the arrest
rate would decrease after it went into effect.204 That was not the case, however. In
addition to the lack of any change in homicide or assault rates, there was also no
significant decrease in the arrests of juveniles age thirteen to fifteen for rape and
arson.205 The authors believed that a likely explanation for this surprising finding is
that juveniles are not deterred by the increased severity of the new sentences.206 They
concluded that “by far the simplest interpretation of the results is that the [Juvenile
Offender] Law was ineffective in reducing crime.”207
		2. Transfer Laws Disproportionately Affect Minority Males

Although New York courts have held that the Juvenile Offender Law does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because it is “not directed at any class of
individuals on account of race, national origin, religion, or sex,”208 there is at least
some evidence that legislative exclusion statutes “operate[] to the disadvantage of
some suspect class,”209 specifically minority males. For example, a Special Report
published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that in 1998 62.2% of juveniles
prosecuted in adult criminal courts were black and 19.9% were white (nonHispanic).210 However, overall population data for the forty counties in the sample
202. Singer & McDowall, supra note 32, at 529.
203. Id. at 526. The arrest rates for juveniles age thirteen to fifteen who were affected by the Juvenile

Offender Law were compared against two control groups: sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds in New York
(who were not affected by the law because youth age sixteen and above are defined as adults in New
York) and thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds in Philadelphia, which did not have a similar legislative
exclusion statute. Id. at 526–31.

204. Id. at 526.
205. Id. at 530. Although the arrest rate for rape and arson among thirteen- to fifteen-year-olds decreased in

New York City, the authors also noted a similar decline in their control groups (juveniles age sixteen to
nineteen who were not affected by the law, and juveniles in Philadelphia). Id.

206. Id. at 532–33.
207. Id. at 532.
208. People v. Ryals, 420 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259–260 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1979); see also People v. Killeen, 603

N.Y.S.2d 510, 510 (2d Dep’t 1993).

209. Ryals, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 259–60 (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
210. Rainville & Smith, supra note 197, at 2 tbl.3. The researchers used a sample size of 7135 juveniles

(ranging in age from fifteen to seventeen) charged with felonies in criminal courts around the country
in 1998. Id. at 1. The data was drawn from forty of the country’s largest urban counties in nineteen
states. Id. Among those included in the sample were six counties in New York: Bronx, Kings, New York,
Queens, Suffolk, and Westchester. Id. at 11 app. 2.
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shows that in the general population, black juveniles made up only 23.2% of the
population, whereas white juveniles constituted 67.1%. 211 In addition, 95.8% of
juveniles charged in criminal court were male, 212 whereas in the general population
the ratio of males and females is almost equal.213
The increased rate of young black males in the criminal justice system is probably
not the result of prosecutors or judges consciously deciding to treat one class of
juveniles differently than another due to their race and sex. Rather, it is likely a result
of the legislative decision to impose greater punishments on specific offenses.214 As
one commentator noted, “police have arrested black juveniles under the age of
eighteen years for all violent offenses . . . at a rate about five times as great as that of
white youths . . . . Thus, any sentencing policy that targets violent offenders inevitably
will have a racially disparate impact on minority youths.”215
One would expect that under judicial waiver statutes, under which juvenile court
judges have broad discretion to transfer children to criminal court and enjoy a
deferential standard for appellate review, 216 racial disparities in transfers to criminal
court would be more pronounced than under statutes that transfer juveniles based on
objective criteria, such as age and alleged offense. Although the statutory reforms
may have reduced the most blatant racial discrimination, racial bias is now “simply
manifested in less obvious ways . . . making disparate treatment more intricate and
harder to detect.”217
In New York specifically, of the 10,000 juveniles between the ages of thirteen
and fifteen who were arrested and charged under the Juvenile Offender Law from
1978 to 1985, 85% were minorities.218 In addition, minorities were significantly less
likely to be granted youthful offender status, which provides a more lenient sentencing
scheme, than their white counterparts. 219 In addition, nonwhite males who were
211. Id. at 11 app. 2.
212. Id. at 2 tbl.3.
213. See id. at 11 app. 2. However, “[t]he very small percentage of females in the waived population is due in

large measure to the comparatively low incidence of female offending,” rather than any blatant attempt
to punish males more than females. Bishop, supra note 56, at 104.

214. Id. at 111.
215. Feld, supra note 10, at 109. Not everyone agrees with this theory. Two explanations for racial disparities

in the transfer of juveniles to criminal court have emerged recently: some commentators contend that
minorities are transferred more often because they are the worst offenders, while others argue that the
juvenile justice system is racially biased. See M.A. Bortner et al., Race and Transfer: Empirical Research
and Social Context, in The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to
the Criminal Court 277, 278 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).

216. See Lynda E. Frost Clausel & Richard J. Bonnie, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, in The Changing Borders

of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Criminal Court 181, 184 (Jeffrey Fagan
& Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).

217. Bortner et al., supra note 215, at 281.
218. Bishop, supra note 56, at 110–11.
219. Id. at 116–17.
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sentenced as juvenile offenders were 1.7 times more likely to be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment than white males.220
IV.	SUGGESTIONS TO BRING THE NEW YORK JUVENILE OFFENDER LAW INTO
COMPLIANCE WITH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

This part will explore three options that New York courts and the legislature can
undertake to bring the present statutory scheme into conformity with recent national
trends. First, the New York State Legislature can amend the law to require that all
juveniles be brought before the juvenile court prior to being transferred to criminal
court, thus ensuring that the practice of trying juveniles in criminal courts becomes the
exception rather than the rule. Second, the legislature could increase the maximum age
of juvenile court jurisdiction to seventeen, thereby placing an entire group of juveniles
under the jurisdiction of the family court for adjudication and sentencing. Third, judges
and attorneys could interpret the Juvenile Offender Law with a focus on rehabilitation,
taking advantage of the reverse waiver and youthful offender provisions to remove
more juveniles to family court while simultaneously incarcerating fewer juveniles.
A. Place Original Jurisdiction Back in Family Court for All Juveniles

One option to bring the Juvenile Offender Law into compliance with recent
developments is to amend the statutes to place original jurisdiction back in the family
court for all juveniles, regardless of the offense charged. Thus, juveniles of a certain
age charged with one of the enumerated “ juvenile offenses” would no longer be
excluded from juvenile court and automatically tried in criminal court. Instead, all
proceedings against juveniles would commence in juvenile court. If the legislature
still wishes to transfer some habitual offenders to criminal court, it can implement a
judicial waiver system to allow juvenile court judges to transfer certain youth after an
individualized assessment of their amenability to treatment.
New Jersey’s judicial waiver statute, which does not provide a mechanism for
juveniles to be prosecuted in criminal court without first appearing in juvenile court, is
an example of this approach.221 Under the New Jersey statute, a child between the age
of fourteen and seventeen, 222 charged with one of the offenses listed in the waiver
statute, may be transferred to criminal court under certain circumstances.223 Depending
on the offense, the waiver may be mandatory, discretionary, or presumptive.224 For
example, if a juvenile is charged with certain serious offenses, such as homicide,
220. Id. at 117. It should be noted that white juveniles were sentenced, on average, to a term of imprisonment

five months longer than non-white individuals. Id. However, the researchers believed that this result
was due to the fact that whites were less likely to be sentenced as juvenile offenders unless their crimes
were especially violent. Id.

221. GAO Report, supra note 69, at 79 app. IV.
222. Unlike New York, which prosecutes all youth ages sixteen and above in criminal court, the maximum

age of juvenile court jurisdiction in New Jersey is seventeen. Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 21.

223. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-26(a) (West Supp. 2009).
224. See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 3.
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robbery, sexual assault, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and aggravated arson, the
juvenile court judge must transfer the case to criminal court after finding probable
cause to believe that the juvenile committed the act.225 However, if a juvenile is charged
with other less serious offenses, the judge may transfer the case to criminal court only
after the State demonstrates “that the nature and circumstances of the charge or the
prior record of the juvenile are sufficiently serious that the interests of the public require
waiver.”226
Furthermore, the New Jersey statute provides, for all juveniles except those age
sixteen or older charged with a serious offense, that when “the juvenile can show that
the probability of his rehabilitation by the use of the procedures, services and facilities
available to the court prior to the juvenile reaching the age of 19 substantially
outweighs the reasons for waiver, waiver shall not be granted.” 227 Although the
mandatory waiver provisions of the New Jersey statute are similar to New York’s
legislative exclusion statute—requiring transfer to criminal court based solely on age
and offense charged—its other provisions are a helpful starting point.
If New York implemented a statute similar to New Jersey’s discretionary judicial
waiver law, the juvenile court would possess original jurisdiction for all juveniles
under the age of sixteen, and transfer to criminal court would only be available after
a Kent hearing. 228 In Kent, the Supreme Court recommended eight factors to be
considered in determining whether a juvenile’s case should be transferred to criminal
court, including the gravity of the offense, the juvenile’s danger to the community,
the juvenile’s personal characteristics, and the rehabilitative options available in
juvenile court.229 If New York requires that all proceedings against juveniles begin in
juvenile court, the legislature must consider which Kent factors juvenile court judges
should consider prior to transferring a juvenile to criminal court. The chosen factors
should focus more on the juvenile’s amenability to treatment than on society’s desire
to feel that justice has been done.
Furthermore, in contrast to New Jersey, New York should adopt judicial waiver
procedures that do not apply a presumption that certain juveniles are not amenable to
treatment and should not be tried in family court. Rather, the law should be written
to require prosecutors who wish to transfer juveniles to criminal court to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment. In
doing so, the prosecutors could offer evidence that the juvenile demonstrates a
pattern of increasingly violent behavior and that prior opportunities for rehabilitation,
such as community-based alternatives to incarceration, have failed to redirect the
juvenile’s conduct.
By placing the original jurisdiction for all juveniles back in juvenile court,
regardless of the offense charged, the procedure will be more consistent with the
225. N.J.S.A. § 2A:4A-26(a).
226. Id. § 2A:4A-26(a)(3).
227. Id. § 2A:4A-26(e).
228. See supra notes 34–35, 88 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 88.
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growing national movement toward rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Imprisonment
for juveniles will again become a last resort, as those that are adjudicated delinquent
in family court may be sentenced to a number of dispositions other than a prison
term.230 In addition, the procedures will require a juvenile court judge to consider the
juvenile’s amenability to treatment prior to transfer.
This approach would also take into account juveniles’ diminished responsibility
for their actions in light of the developmental and psychological differences between
adolescents and adults.231 Juveniles will still be responsible for their actions; however
they will not be criminally responsible and punished through the adult system
without an individualized hearing and a finding that they are habitual offenders who
are not amenable to rehabilitation through the juvenile justice system.
Although there is some criticism that juvenile waiver statutes provide the juvenile
court judge with “broad, standardless discretion,” which results in arbitrary transfers
and racial bias in waiver decisions, 232 it is preferable to legislative exclusion statutes.
Broad discretion is still a key component of legislative exclusion and direct file
statutes, but this discretion is hidden because it is exercised by the arresting officers
and prosecutors when they decide what charges, if any, to bring against the juvenile.
In New York, because juveniles are only subject to prosecution in criminal court if
they are charged with a designated “juvenile offense,” the charging decisions currently
replace the judge’s decision to waive juvenile court jurisdiction. But unlike a juvenile
court judge’s transfer decision, charging decisions are not guided by any set of factors
and are not reviewable by appellate courts.233 “An adversarial hearing at which both
the state and defense can present relevant evidence more likely will produce accurate,
correct, and fair decisions than prosecutors will make in their offices without access
to critical information and subject to extraneous political considerations.”234
B. Increase the Maximum Age of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction to Seventeen

New York legislators should seriously consider increasing the presumptive age of
criminal responsibility from sixteen to eighteen. New York will soon be the only
state in the country that still prosecutes all sixteen-year-olds in criminal court
regardless of the offense charged or their level of maturity and culpability.235 As
previously discussed, juvenile courts offer more treatment programs than criminal
courts. 236 In addition, there are fewer stigmas associated with a juvenile court
disposition, as records are sealed and juveniles will avoid a criminal conviction that
230. See Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 192, at 21.
231. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
232. See Feld, supra note 10, at 90; Clausel & Bonnie, supra note 216, at 188.
233. Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 2.
234. Feld, supra note 10, at 128 (advocating for mandatory waiver hearings to be conducted in criminal court

prior to a juvenile’s prosecution).

235. See discussion supra Part II.F.1.
236. See Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 192.
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may limit future employment prospects.237 Finally, although sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds are more mature than thirteen- to fifteen-year-olds, and are thus less likely
to act impulsively, succumb to peer pressure, and engage in risky behavior, their
capacities for rational decisionmaking and comprehension of the criminal justice
system are still less developed than adults.238 Therefore, it would be more appropriate
to place all juveniles below the age of eighteen in family court and permit judicial
transfers to criminal court for repeat offenders and others not amenable to treatment.
One possible criticism of this proposal is that it will substantially increase juvenile
court costs if all sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds are adjudicated in family court.
However, if the juvenile court system will suddenly face a large increase in its docket,
it would follow that the criminal court system will lose a large number of cases to the
family court. And it is likely more costly to adjudicate juveniles in criminal court as
opposed to juvenile court because “[c]riminal prosecutions demand more resources
than juvenile ones. They require more hearings, involve more attorney preparation,
call on investigative resources, are more likely to result in jury trials, and take at least
twice as long to process as comparable cases in juvenile court.”239
C.	Apply the Juvenile Offender Law with a Focus on Rehabilitation Rather Than
Punishment

If a complete overhaul of the Juvenile Offender Law is not feasible, either due to cost
or the protracted nature of amending a statute, courts can still interpret its provisions
with a goal toward rehabilitation. Almost all the actors in the criminal justice system,
from the judges and defense attorneys to the police officers and prosecutors, have an
opportunity under the current statutory scheme to make the system less punitive by
simply applying the Juvenile Offender Law in a rehabilitative manner.240
As discussed previously, once a juvenile has been arraigned in criminal court, he
may file a motion to request removal to family court,241 and the criminal court judge
will consider whether the “interests of justice” would be served in removing the juvenile
237. Fagan, supra note 56.
238. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
239. Bishop, supra note 56, at 123.
240. Therapeutic jurisprudence provides another option to treat and rehabilitate these juvenile offenders. A

movement co-founded by Bruce Winick and David Wexler, therapeutic jurisprudence “assess[es] the
therapeutic and counter-therapeutic consequences of law and how it is applied . . . to effect legal change.”
Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. Rev. 33 (2000).
The values of therapeutic jurisprudence are put into play throughout various specialized problem-solving
courts across the country. A thorough discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this
note. For more information, see Kelly O’Keefe, Ctr. for Court Innovation, The Brooklyn Mental
Health Court Evaluation: Planning, Implementation, Courtroom Dynamics, and Participant
Outcomes 3-4 (2006), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/BMHCevaluation.
pdf; John E. Cummings, The Cost of Crazy: How Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Mental Health Courts Lower
Incarceration Rates, Reduce Recidivism, and Improve Public Safety, 56 Loy. L. Rev. 279, 280 (2010).

241. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
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to family court.242 The judge may consider a number of factors, including “the history,
character, and condition of the defendant” and “any other relevant fact indicating that a
judgment of conviction in the criminal court would serve no useful purpose.”243 As
there is no statutory requirement regarding which factors a judge must examine or the
weight that the judge should attribute to each factor, judges have substantial discretion
when considering whether to remove a juvenile to family court. Therefore, the reverse
waiver provisions in the Juvenile Offender Law afford judges and defense attorneys a
valuable opportunity to interpret the removal provisions in a rehabilitative light, erring
on the side of caution and removing the juvenile to family court when it appears it
would be in the juvenile’s interest to do so.244
Under these factors, a zealous defense attorney may introduce evidence of the
juvenile’s immaturity, mental illness, developmental disability, family support,
employment, and educational achievements to convince the judge that the juvenile
would be better served by treatment through the family court than prosecution in
criminal court. The judge, in turn, can weigh these factors as he or she sees fit. For
example, one criminal court judge considered the defendants’ “age, intelligence,
maturity, character, reputation, habits, physical and mental condition, emotional
attitude and pattern of living” as well as their “prior contacts with the law, family
court history, school attendance record, work history, family ties, home and social
environment, and length of residence within the community,” 245 to determine
whether removal from criminal to family court was appropriate.
Furthermore, if a juvenile is charged with the most serious offenses, including
murder, rape, criminal sexual acts, and armed felony, the judge must also find
mitigating circumstances to warrant the juvenile’s removal to family court.246 This
provides yet another opportunity for defense attorneys to submit documentation of
the juvenile’s immaturity, developmental disability, mental illness, impulsivity, and
susceptibility to peer pressure when arguing that these mitigating circumstances,
which “bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed,”247 require
the juvenile’s removal to family court.
242. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.43(1)(a) (McKinney 2003).
243. Id. § 210.43(2)(d), (i) (emphasis added). See supra note 120 for the complete list of removal factors.
244. For an excellent example of a judge fully considering each factor involved in the removal decision, see

People v. Gregory C., 602 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494–97 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cnty. 1993).

245. See People v. Martinez, 412 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1978). The criminal court judge

ordered the male defendant to be removed to family court following testimony that the victim of the
robbery was not harmed, the defendant had no prior records in family court, the defendant’s behavior
had been “unstable and erratic” after a recent car accident, the defendant was not on his medication at
the time the offense was committed, and he was under the domineering inf luence of his female
co-defendant. Id. at 280–81. However, the judge refused to remove the female defendant after it was
revealed that she had been recently arrested for another robbery and her school records indicated she
was violent and disruptive. Id. at 281.

246. Crim. Proc. § 210.43(1)(b). The district attorney must also consent to the juvenile’s removal to family

court in these circumstances. Id.

247. Id.
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Police officers, probation officers, and prosecutors also have an opportunity to
apply the Juvenile Offender Law in a less punitive manner. For example, police officers
may exercise their informal discretion and choose to release a child with a warning or
refer him to services instead of arresting him.248 Probation officers have the authority
to collect information about a juvenile offender case and then dismiss the case, divert
the case from court, or file a complaint in criminal court.249 The District Attorney’s
Office also has discretion to divert the case, refuse to prosecute the case, or file a
complaint in criminal court.250 In addition, prosecutors may choose to charge relatively
minor offenders with less serious crimes (that is, crimes that are not listed as “juvenile
offenses” under the statute) to avoid subjecting these juveniles to criminal court.251
Although it is unreasonable to suggest that prosecutors should decide not to charge a
child with a juvenile offense when there is probable cause to believe he has committed
murder, kidnapping, or rape, it is possible that a prosecutor may decide to charge a
juvenile with second-degree robbery (not a juvenile offense unless committed with a
weapon or resulting in injury) instead of first-degree robbery (a juvenile offense) in
order to circumvent the Juvenile Offender Law’s harsh consequences.252
New York courts have recognized this method of evading the Juvenile Offender
Law and have attempted to stop prosecutors from taking advantage of this loophole.
Courts have held that even when a juvenile is charged with both juvenile and nonjuvenile offenses, the criminal court possesses original jurisdiction, and the juvenile
is not subject to juvenile delinquency proceedings in family court absent removal
from criminal court to family court.253 In addition, prosecutors cannot circumvent
the statutory scheme by charging the juvenile with only non-juvenile offenses when
the evidence shows that the child also committed a juvenile offense.254 Although
these precedents may make it more difficult for prosecutors to exercise their discretion
in choosing which charges to bring against a potential juvenile offender, the
circumstances are usually not so black and white.255 In cases where the prosecutor
248. See Cannon et al., supra note 18, at 19.
249. See id. at 20.
250. See id. There is evidence that New York City prosecutors are already considering methods to avoid

trying juvenile offenders in criminal court. In 2008, 2223 arrests were made for “ juvenile offenses,” yet
only thirty percent of these cases were docketed for arraignment. Id. at 19 tbl.1. The remaining seventy
percent were dismissed or removed to family court. Id.

251. See Singer & McDowall, supra note 32, at 528.
252. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 10.00(18), 160.10 (McKinney 2003).
253. In re Kaminski G., 908 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (Fam. Ct. Queens Cnty. 2010).
254. In re Travis Y., 896 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Fam. Ct. Queens Cnty. 2010). If the nonhearsay allegations

indicate that the juvenile committed one or more juvenile offenses, the case must be first brought in
criminal court or not at all. Id.

255. For example, burglary in the first degree and burglary in the second degree are “ juvenile offenses” that,

if charged, subject all fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds to prosecution in criminal court. See Penal
§ 10.00(18)(2). However, burglary in the third degree is not a juvenile offense, and thus a youth of the
same age charged with third-degree burglary will not be prosecuted in criminal court. Id. The main
difference between second- and third-degree burglary in New York is that, in second-degree burglary,
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could reasonably choose between one charge and another, and where one of those
charges would result in the juvenile escaping prosecution in criminal court, the
prosecutor could interpret the statute with a focus on rehabilitation and choose to
charge the non-juvenile offense.
To determine whether simply applying the Juvenile Offender Law in a
rehabilitative manner could actually affect the outcome, consider the case of fifteenyear-old Anthony.256 Anthony and a sixteen-year-old friend assaulted an elderly man
and robbed him of seven cents.257 Anthony was arrested and charged with robbery in
the first degree, a juvenile offense.258 Consequently, he was prosecuted in criminal
court, convicted, and ultimately sentenced to an indeterminate term of two to six
years’ imprisonment (to be served in a juvenile detention facility). 259
Now consider what may have occurred if everyone involved in Anthony’s case
had interpreted the Juvenile Offender Statute with a focus on rehabilitation. First,
perhaps Anthony could have been charged with a non-juvenile offense, thus avoiding
criminal court altogether. According to prosecutors, Anthony and his friend knocked
the victim to the ground, Anthony punched him, and the boys took his money.260
They were carrying BB guns at the time.261 It is possible that Anthony could have
been charged with robbery in the second degree262 instead of robbery in the first
degree, and thus avoided prosecution in criminal court.263 The extent of the victim’s
the offender must display a dangerous weapon or cause physical injury to another person during an
unlawful entry into a building, whereas third-degree burglary merely requires unlawful entry into the
building. See id. §§ 140.20, 140.25. Exactly what constitutes a dangerous weapon or a physical injury
may be ambiguous, and thus prosecutors may have the option of choosing which charge to bring against
the juvenile.
256. Dean Praetorius, Anthony Stewart, 15-Year-Old from Syracuse, N.Y., Jailed for Assault and 7-Cent Robbery,

HuffingtonPost.com (Aug. 30, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/30/
anthony-stewart-7-cent-robbery_n_942036.html.

257. Id.
258. Id.; see also Penal § 10.00(18).
259. Tim Knauss, Syracuse 15-Year-Old Gets Two to Six Years for 7-Cent Robbery, The Post-Standard (Aug.

29, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2011/08/syracuse_15-year-old_gets_
two.html.

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Robbery in the second degree, subsection one, is not a juvenile offense. See Penal § 10.00(18). “A

person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when he forcibly steals property and when: 1. He is
aided by another person actually present . . . .” Id. § 160.10.

263. Robbery in the first degree is a juvenile offense, which would subject Anthony to prosecution in criminal

court. See id. § 10.00(18).

A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he forcibly steals property and
when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom,
he or another participant in the crime: 1. Causes serious physical injury to any person
who is not a participant in the crime; or 2. Is armed with a deadly weapon; or 3. Uses or
threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or 4. Displays what appears to
be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; except that in any
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injuries was not reported, so it is difficult to draw a conclusion. The example is
merely to illustrate the options that are available to prosecutors to avoid placing
juveniles in the criminal justice system whenever possible.
Once Anthony was arraigned in criminal court, his attorney could have filed a
motion to remove his case to family court based on his limited involvement in the
crime, the minimal harm caused by the crime, and perhaps Anthony’s susceptibility
to peer pressure or other unexplored factors.264 If the judge had applied the factors
with a focus on rehabilitation, he could have decided to remove Anthony to family
court, where a variety of dispositions in place of incarceration would be available to
treat and rehabilitate Anthony.265
Finally, if the judge in Anthony’s case had interpreted the sentencing provisions
of the Juvenile Offender Law in a rehabilitative manner, he could have found
Anthony eligible for “youthful offender” sentencing.266 Judges may sentence juvenile
offenders under the more lenient youthful offender statute if the judge finds that “the
interest of justice would be served.”267 The judge could have considered the small
amount of money taken from the victim, Anthony’s criminal history, and any other
factors to determine that the interest of justice would be served by finding Anthony
eligible for a youthful offender sentence. The judge, however, took the opposite
approach and stressed Anthony’s refusal to plead guilty as a justification for not
applying the youthful offender sentencing provisions.268
prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver,
rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a loaded weapon from which a
shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, could be
discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, robbery in the second degree, robbery in
the third degree or any other crime.

Id. § 160.15.

264. See N.Y. Crim Proc. Law §§ 180.75, 210.43 (McKinney 2006). It is possible Anthony’s attorney did

file a motion to remove his case to family court, but that information is not available.

265. In New York, the possible dispositions available in family court include placement in a secure facility for

a maximum of twelve months for a misdemeanor, eighteen months for a felony, and five years for a
designated felony; referral to an alternative-to-incarceration program; conditional discharge;
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal; or probation supervision. Cannon et al., supra note 18, at
29. The sentences available in criminal court include placement in a secure facility for a minimum of
one year and a maximum of life (depending on the offense committed), conditional discharge,
unconditional discharge, probation, restitution, or fines. Id. at 30–31.

266. In 2008, forty percent of juvenile offenders in New York found to be eligible for youthful offender

sentencing were sentenced to placement in a secure facility, whereas eighty-six percent of juvenile
offenders sentenced as juvenile offenders were placed in a secure facility. Id. at 32. The average length of
stay in New York State Department of Correctional Services for youthful offenders was 14.7 months,
where the average for juvenile offenders was 60.4 months. Id. at 33.

267. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
268. See Knauss, supra note 259. Anthony’s accomplice, sixteen-year-old Skyler, pleaded guilty and was

sentenced as a “youthful offender.” Id. He was sentenced to one and one-third to four years in state
prison. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

Over thirty years have passed since the Juvenile Offender Law was enacted in
1978 as a response to increased juvenile crime. Since then, crime has decreased,
studies have been published indicating that juveniles, due to their immaturity and
developmental delay, are less criminally culpable than adults, and statistics regarding
the law’s ineffectiveness have been widely disseminated. In addition, three U.S.
Supreme Court cases—Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama—
have concluded that certain severe punishments for juveniles are unconstitutional. In
response to these changes, many states have increased the number of youth
adjudicated through their juvenile courts by modifying the boundary age separating
juveniles from adults or by transferring less youth to criminal court.
New York, on the other hand, has not revisited its Juvenile Offender Law to take
into account these recent developments. Various provisions of the law, including its
harsh sentencing structure and failure to consider individualized needs prior to a
juvenile’s prosecution in criminal court, are no longer in compliance with national
standards. Through this introduction to New York’s statutory exclusion provisions and
the prevailing trends in juvenile justice, this note aims to motivate others to advocate
for changes to the way New York treats one of its most vulnerable populations.
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Appendix
States

Type of Transfer Law(s)269

Maximum
Age of
Juvenile
Court
Jurisdiction270

Minimum
Age to
Transfer a
Juvenile to
Criminal
Court271

Amenability
Hearing
Required
Prior to
Transfer272

Reverse Waiver
Available to
Remove Juveniles
From Criminal
Court Back to
Juvenile Court273

Alabama

Judicial Waiver (D),
Statutory Exclusion

17

14

Depends274

No

Alaska

Judicial Waiver (D, P),
Statutory Exclusion

17

No age
restriction

Depends

No

Arizona

Judicial Waiver (D), Direct
File, Statutory Exclusion

17

No age
restriction

Depends

Yes

Arkansas

Judicial Waiver (D), Direct
File

17

14

Depends

Yes

California

Judicial Waiver (D, P),
Direct File, Statutory
Exclusion

17

14

Depends

Yes

Colorado

Judicial Waiver (D, P),
Direct File

17

12

Depends

Yes

Connecticut

Judicial Waiver (M)

17

14

No

Yes

Delaware

Judicial Waiver (D, M),
Statutory Exclusion

17

No age
restriction

Depends

Yes

District of
Columbia

Judicial Waiver (D, P),
Direct File

17

15

Depends

No

Florida

Judicial Waiver (D), Direct
File, Statutory Exclusion

17

No age
restriction

Depends

No

269. See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 3. Data is current as of 2009. Id. “D” stands for discretionary

judicial waiver, “P” denotes presumptive judicial waiver, and “M” is mandatory judicial waiver.

270. See id. at 21.
271. See id. at 4–6. When a state employs multiple mechanisms to transfer a juvenile to criminal court, the

age listed is the minimum age a child can be transferred in that state. In some states, the legislature
designates a minimum age to transfer the child via judicial waiver and a separate minimum age to
transfer a child through direct file or legislative exclusion. For those states, the lowest age is shown. If,
under one or more transfer mechanisms, the state does not specify a minimum age to transfer the child,
“No age restriction” is listed.

272. See id. at 3.
273. See id.
274. Whether an amenability hearing is required depends on whether the child is transferred pursuant to the

juvenile court judge’s authority under a discretionary or presumptive judicial waiver statute or rather
under a direct file, statutory exclusion, or mandatory judicial waiver law, all of which circumvent Kent’s
requirement for an individualized amenability hearing prior to transferring a juvenile to adult criminal
court. Thus, whether the child receives an amenability hearing will depend on which mechanism the
state decides to employ when transferring the juvenile.
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States

Type of Transfer Law(s)

Maximum
Age of
Juvenile
Court
Jurisdiction

Minimum
Age to
Transfer a
Juvenile to
Criminal
Court

Amenability
Hearing
Required
Prior to
Transfer

Reverse Waiver
Available to
Remove Juveniles
From Criminal
Court Back to
Juvenile Court

Georgia

Judicial Waiver (D, M),
Direct File, Statutory
Exclusion

16

No age
restriction

Depends

Yes

Hawaii

Judicial Waiver (D)

17

14

Yes

No

Idaho

Judicial Waiver (D),
Statutory Exclusion

17

14

Depends

No

Illinois

Judicial Waiver (D, P, M),
Statutory Exclusion

16275

13

Depends

No

Indiana

Judicial Waiver (D, M),
Statutory Exclusion

17

16

Depends

No

Iowa

Judicial Waiver (D),
Statutory Exclusion

17

14

Depends

Yes

Kansas

Judicial Waiver (D, P)

17

10

Yes

No

Kentucky

Judicial Waiver (D, M)

17

14

Depends

Yes

Louisiana

Judicial Waiver (D, M),
Direct File, Statutory
Exclusion

16

14

Depends

No

Maine

Judicial Waiver (D, P)

17

No age
restriction

Yes

No

Maryland

Judicial Waiver (D),
Statutory Exclusion

17

14

Depends

Yes

Massachusetts Statutory Exclusion

16

14

No

No

Michigan

Judicial Waiver (D), Direct
File

16

14

Depends

No

Minnesota

Judicial Waiver (D, P),
Statutory Exclusion

17

14

Depends

No

Mississippi

Judicial Waiver (D),
Statutory Exclusion

17

13

Depends

Yes

Missouri

Judicial Waiver (D)

16

12

Yes

No

Montana

Direct File, Statutory
Exclusion

17

12

No

Yes

Nebraska

Direct File

17

No age
restriction

No

Yes

Nevada

Judicial Waiver (D, P),
Statutory Exclusion

17

No age
restriction

Depends

Yes

New
Hampshire

Judicial Waiver (D, P)

16

13

Yes

No

2
275. In Illinois, the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction is sixteen for juveniles charged with felonies and

seventeen for those charged with misdemeanors. See Griffin et al., supra note 18, at 21.
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States

Type of Transfer Law(s)

Maximum
Age of
Juvenile
Court
Jurisdiction

Minimum
Age to
Transfer a
Juvenile to
Criminal
Court

Amenability
Hearing
Required
Prior to
Transfer

Reverse Waiver
Available to
Remove Juveniles
From Criminal
Court Back to
Juvenile Court

New Jersey

Judicial Waiver (D, P, M)

17

14

Depends

No

New Mexico

Statutory Exclusion

17

15

No

No

New York

Statutory Exclusion

15

13

No

Yes

North
Carolina

Judicial Waiver (D, M)

15

13

Depends

No

North Dakota

Judicial Waiver (D, P, M)

17

14

Depends

No

Ohio

Judicial Waiver (D, M)

17

14

Depends

Yes276

Oklahoma

Judicial Waiver (D), Direct
File, Statutory Exclusion

17

No age
restriction

Depends

Yes

Oregon

Judicial Waiver (D),
Statutory Exclusion

17

15

Depends

Yes

Pennsylvania

Judicial Waiver (D, P),
Statutory Exclusion

17

No age
restriction

Depends

Yes

Rhode Island

Judicial Waiver (D, P, M)

17

16

Depends

No

South
Carolina

Judicial Waiver (D, M),
Statutory Exclusion

16

14

Depends

No

South Dakota

Judicial Waiver (D),
Statutory Exclusion

17

No age
restriction

Depends

Yes

Tennessee

Judicial Waiver (D)

17

16

Yes

Yes

Texas

Judicial Waiver (D)

16

15

Yes

No

Utah

Judicial Waiver (D, P),
Statutory Exclusion

17

14

Depends

No

Vermont

Judicial Waiver (D), Direct
File, Statutory Exclusion

17

10

Depends

Yes

Virginia

Judicial Waiver (D, M),
Direct File

17

14

Depends

Yes

Washington

Judicial Waiver (D),
Statutory Exclusion

17

No age
restriction

Depends

No

West Virginia

Judicial Waiver (D, M)

17

No age
restriction

Depends

No

Wisconsin

Judicial Waiver (D),
Statutory Exclusion

16

10

Depends

Yes

Wyoming

Judicial Waiver (D), Direct
File

17

13

Depends

Yes

276. Ohio recently amended a number of its transfer provisions. This included, among other changes, adding

a “reverse bindover” process to remove juveniles back to juvenile court under certain circumstances. See
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2152.151, 2152.122 (LexisNexis 2012).
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